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Abstract
This paper analyzes the Aristotelian notion of phronesis, such as it appears in 
Book VI of the Nicomachean Ethics, detailing what sort of model to grasp practical 
reason it entails: a practical wisdom. Setting it against the backdrop of a reflection 
on the prevalent uses and meanings of reason today, and the consequences these 
views have for a depiction of selfhood and human action, the paper shows how, amid 
the contemporary revival of Aristotelian practical philosophy, Paul Ricœur updates 
this phronetic model in Oneself as Another. The paper discusses the implications 
of such a thick account of selfhood and human action, such as it being a potential 
key to overcome some difficulties caused by Kantian moral philosophy, while it 
also calls, with and beyond Ricœur, for a refinement of the phronetic model by 
taking into account not only its thick intersubjective grounding but also the limits 
to rationality and the need to take the plurality of life forms that can count as being 
examples of a ‘life worth living’ (a good life).
Keywords: Aristotle, phronesis, practical reason, Ricœur.
1  This paper develops some aspects of the postdoctoral project in which I put forward 
a “critique of miserable reason” and it benefited from the postdoctoral scholarship granted 
by the Foundation for Science and Technology, FCT, I.P., (SFRH/BPD/102949/2014) and 
the contract signed under the D.L. 57/2016 ‘norma transitória’. The paper is also financed 
by national funds through the Foundation for Science and Technology, FCT, I.P., in the 
framework of the CECH-UC project: UIDB/00196/2020.
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Introduction
Discussion on the definition, aims, status and proper functioning of 
reason is a longstanding trait of Western thought. In a way, the task of defining 
what is specifically rational, circumscribing its scope and grasping it within 
a description of the allegedly rational ‘subject’ is almost coextensive with 
philosophy itself, in its difference with common sense or pre-philosophical 
(e.g. mythical) accounts of reality. Indeed, the history of philosophy, at least 
as we understand it within the Western tradition, is again and again traversed 
by the rational claim and its demarcation from (true or false) opinion, as 
well as by the association between reason and truth.
This is certainly a non-linear history, with many twists and turns. But 
it has had decisive historical moments of affirmation, not only in the Athens 
of Plato and Aristotle, but also in the modern philosophical landscape (e.g., 
the Cartesian newfound insistence on the rational method or the whole 
project of the Enlightenment, to name just the more famous examples) 
and, significantly, in the disciplinary breakoffs from philosophy such as 
modern science itself, with its exclusions of formal and final Aristotelian 
causality, and its insistence on objectivity. And it is worthy to mention that 
these breakoffs evidently include the formal birth of social sciences such as 
sociology, or behavioral sciences such as psychology, both heavily influenced, 
at the start, by the Positivist atmosphere of the late 19th Century. As such, 
one could say that in spite of its many twists and turns, at least until the 20th 
Century the theoretical emphasis on rationality was ever-growing, and one 
need only mention Hegelian philosophy to grasp its overarching expansion.
The result of this overabundance of rationality is, in my view, twofold. 
On the one hand, the prestige of so-called rational methods that were the 
result of the modern project paradoxically gave way to a reductionist 
understanding of what counts as “rational”, identifying it either with the 
results of technoscience or, in the domain of human action, with self-
-interested behavior (namely within mainstream economics), and thus 
obnubilating the semantic and philosophical polysemy of this notion and 
more particularly the forms of reason associated with the Humanities. 
On the other hand, the very way in which reason came to be understood 
after Modernity, the vocabulary and specific viewpoint adopted thereafter, 
widened the hermeneutic gap separating us from the Greek philosophers 
of Antiquity and worsened our real chances of grasping their worldview 
and the significance of their philosophical landscape.
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At the same time, the difficulties encountered by the modern project 
and the critiques it has been subjected to in the 20th Century not only 
had an alleged ‘Postmodernity’ as its alternative; on the contrary, several 
meaningful revivals of pre-Modern philosophy took place. In this article, I 
want to look at a particular revival, that of practical philosophy under the 
guise of neo-Aristotelianism. More specifically, I will discuss the significance 
of practical reason in Aristotle and the reception it has had in the ethics of 
20th Century French philosopher Paul Ricœur as a way to solve some of the 
impasses within modern moral philosophy, and namely moral Kantianism. 
Thus in the first section I present in some length Aristotle’s notion of 
phronesis such as it appears in book VI of the Nicomachean Ethics2, showing 
its specific epistemic status, the relation between wisdom and reasoning, 
and what this means for the ethical agent. In the second section of this 
paper I start by briefly mentioning the neo-Aristotelian revival in practical 
philosophy in several authors, and then move to one specific author, Paul 
Ricœur, who, in Oneself as Another3, gives center stage to phronesis and 
tries to actualize it within an intersubjective and argumentative framework. 
Finally, in my very brief last section I pinpoint some of the limits and 
critiques that can be put forward to the notion of phronesis itself .
I – Aristotle’s phronetic model
There is a thread running through the history of philosophy and which 
distinguishes between theoretical and practical reasoning. In Aristotelian 
terms, given that human beings are ‘rational animals’, we possess two 
parts of our ‘soul’: one irrational and the other rational, while the latter is 
subdivided in two other parts. Accordingly, the part ruled by theoretical 
reason is dedicated to contemplating that which is unchangeable, while 
practical reason occupies itself with what is changeable and dependent on 
human choice. Now, the consequences of this distinction are twofold: on 
the one hand, not everything can be subject to deliberation, for “no one 
deliberates about the past, but about what is future and contingent” (Aristotle 
1984: 1139 b 6-7); but on the other hand, what is future, contingent and 
dependent on the outcome of human action can indeed be subject to the 
deliberation that is a feature of practical reasoning.
2  Aristotle 1984.
3  Ricœur 1992.
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This distinction is of the utmost importance for two different, and yet 
closely related domains of human action, those dealing with ethics and 
politics. Indeed, what we find in Aristotle’s practical philosophy is a discussion 
of good and bad choices according to the specific excellences – be it moral 
virtues or, more broadly speaking, the excellences (aretai) pertaining to the 
superlative fulfilling of a specific function, e.g. the shoemaker’s excellence 
consists in making excellent shoes – that can be attributed to human action. 
But this also clearly entails a discussion on how ‘objective’ these reasoned 
choices (or, in a slightly different vocabulary, ‘rational decisions’) can be. 
Or, put otherwise, can one hope for the same degree of certainty when 
deliberating over one’s course of action that can be expected in the domain 
of theoretical (scientific) reason? Clearly, for Aristotle, the answer to this 
question is no. But this position does not hold in many instances of later 
practical philosophies, especially in Modern philosophy. To mention only 
one notable example: when devising his moral philosophy, Kant attached 
to his description of the rational ‘kingdom of ends’, with obedience to duty 
(as the fulfillment of the moral ought) as the touchstone of moral action, a 
specific certainty on the ‘simplicity of duty’. Which is to say, at any given 
point it would be simple to discern what is the ‘right thing to do’, i.e., 
one’s duty – whether one actually did the right thing, even against one’s 
wellbeing or desires, that was a different question.
It goes without saying that to a large extent Modern philosophy was 
pervaded by reductionist and/or objectivistic accounts of human behavior, 
in what was sometimes read as a consequence of the scientific turn – as 
if what can be measured, calculated and given an objective form would 
apply equally both to theoretical and to practical reasoning. But this poses 
very specific problems, especially if we run into the empirical difficulties 
of determining the best course of action in any given ‘hard’ situation, i.e., 
a situation in which there is no optimal outcome because the choice is not 
between morally qualified good and bad consequences, but between ‘the 
bad and the worse’.
This is one of the reasons why, as we shall see in the next section, recent 
decades have seen some sort of ‘Aristotelian revival’ in practical philosophy, 
ranging from so-called ‘virtue ethics’ to communitarian substantive accounts 
of the ‘good’ in political philosophy, as well as ‘phronetic’ contextual accounts 
of what is at stake in human decision-making. In this paper, I am mainly 
focusing on this latter aspect. Before delving on some of the aspects of this 
contemporary retrieval of Aristotelian practical philosophy it is therefore 
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important to briefly recall what is at stake in Aristotle’s ‘phronetic model’, 
especially as it appears in book VI of the Nicomachean Ethics .
Phronesis is usually translated as ‘practical reasoning’ or ‘practical 
wisdom’. Both translations point to aspects of this operation that are 
different, yet closely intertwined. For phronesis indeed entails some kind 
of reasoning, the one that follows from deliberation. However, this is 
not some sort of abstract, detached reasoning that would mainly apply to 
itself (like a pure theoretical exercise with no end in sight) or to its object 
(whether a physical object as the result of a given production technique, 
or a theoretical, e.g. mathematical, object); insofar as it pertains to praxis, 
to action, it is closely related to the agent that puts it forward. As such, the 
one who is capable of phronesis undergoes a qualitative change in his or 
her own being: he becomes wise (phronimos). And indeed in that specific 
sense, phronesis is the exercise (and consequence, as a result of reiterated 
repetition) of some sort of practical wisdom.
In Book VI of the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle ties practical wisdom 
not to this or that particular goal but to the overall aim of living a good 
life: “it is thought to be a mark of a man of practical wisdom to be able to 
deliberate well about what is good and expedient for himself, not in some 
particular respect, e.g. about what sorts of thing conduce to health or to 
strength, but about what sorts of thing conduce to the good life in general.” 
(1140 a 25-27). What is clear, then, is that phronetic reasoning seems not to 
be instrumental for a specific goal, given that “good action itself is its end” 
(1140 b 5-6). Aristotles gives the example of Pericles who not only sees 
what is good for himself, but also good “for men in general” (1140 b 10).
A question still remains though as to whether this implies an essentialist 
take on human beings: i.e., whether there would be some things equally 
good for all human beings in general. There are reasons to believe that 
Aristotle was close to upholding such a view when spelling out the ideal 
of the ‘good life’, i.e., happiness or ‘flourishing’ as being connected to the 
exercise of given virtues: insofar as temperance, courage, etc., are good ‘in 
general’ and a ‘mean’ between bad extremes, they are supposed to be good 
for every human being. And it goes without saying that some ‘goods’ would 
be intrinsic to humankind, whether they would be biological (health), material 
(a certain amount of wealth) or even immaterial / relational (friendship). 
But on the other hand it is not at all clear that what it takes to ‘flourish’ or 
even the specific content of the ‘good life’ should be exactly the same for 
each and every one of us.
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What is clear is that the kind of deliberation entailed in practical wisdom 
has a specific epistemic status: it is “the excellence (…) of that part [of the 
soul] which forms opinions; for opinion is about what can be otherwise, 
and so is practical wisdom” (1140 b 25-30). This excellence of opinion on 
how to deliberate on those things that depend on the good choice of action 
must then also be, to say it using the contemporary lingo, context sensitive. 
Aristotle states that phronesis is not only concerned with universals (which 
would be the case of theoretical wisdom) but also with particulars (1141 b 
15-16); because practice needs to delve on particulars and this is why the 
phronimos needs experience and also to rely on experience to pass judgment. 
Thus, Aristotle contends, it is hard for a young man to have practical 
wisdom, for “it is length of time that gives experience” (1142 a 15). So, 
for Aristotle, someone young can excel at the purely theoretical endeavors, 
such as mathematics, but will hardly do so as a natural scientist (for this 
requires observation and experience) or, a fortiori, in the daily decisions 
required by practical wisdom. Conversely, the opinions of “experienced 
older people” should, according to Aristotle, be taken stock of “because 
experience has given them an eye they see aright” (1143 b 13-14).
Aristotle makes this clear at a theoretical level when he holds that there is 
a difference between enquiry in general and deliberation, because deliberation is 
a particular kind of enquiry (1142 a 30). And excellence in deliberation involves 
reasoning (and thus the connection between practical reasoning and practical 
wisdom alluded to above), one that entails a certain form of ‘correctness’ 
(1142 b 16). According to Aristotle, excellence in deliberation can be of two 
sorts, the unqualified sense (e.g. to ends in general) or to a particular end. 
Accordingly, practical wisdom entails an excellence in deliberation concerning 
the specific ends4 towards which it tends (1142 b 30-35).
Nevertheless, phronesis is more than understanding because unders-
tanding only judges, while practical wisdom “issues commands, since its 
end is what ought to be done or not to be done” (1142 a 8-9). Aristotle 
does not ignore that there is a number of difficulties in this depiction; for 
instance, practical wisdom does not, as such, achieve a concrete outcome 
as the result of the application of a technique, like for instance medicine 
produces health; it is also unclear whether one needs to be wise to attain 
the results that practical wisdom procures, or whether one can just obey 
4  On the relation between means and ends in connection with Aristotle’s phronetical 
model, see Angioni 2009.
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someone who is wise (1143 b 30-35). Nevertheless, Aristotle contends 
that not only practical wisdom, as an excellence of one part of the soul, 
is good in itself, but also that it is tied to happiness “as health produces 
health” given that “by being possessed and by actualizing itself it makes 
a man happy” (1144 a 5), which is to say: s/he who possesses the virtues 
and constantly reiterates them wisely in a continuous exercise is happy, i.e. 
flourishes. Or as Aristotle puts it “the function of man is achieved only in 
accordance with practical wisdom as well as with moral excellence; for 
excellence makes the aim right, and practical wisdom the things leading 
to it” (1144 a 6-9). I will come back to this “function of man” on the third 
section below. In a nutshell, Aristotle does not contend that all excellences 
are forms of practical wisdom (and he reproaches Socrates for allegedly 
holding this position) but he does say (crediting Socrates for that) that the 
excellences imply practical wisdom (1144 b 20), for practical reason is the 
‘right reason’ for practical matters.
What is further argued, as should already be clear from the stated above, 
is that there is a co-dependence between goodness (moral excellence) and 
practical wisdom for excellence needs the “eye of the soul” (1144 a 29) of 
phronesis in order to be attained. The metaphor of the eye is here important, 
but it should not blind us to the fact that phronesis also involves a sense of 
touch, that is, a certain ‘tact’ (Contreras Tasso 2011) that is exploratory in 
nature. Moreover, this embodied, corporeal dimension of the interpretation 
of one’s surroundings and of the orientation of action is also very important 
for the hermeneutics of selfhood and even to what Richard Kearney calls 
‘carnal hermeneutics’ (Kearney 2015).
In this short section we have thus seen several traits of Aristotle’s 
phronetic model. Before moving to the next section, allow me to summarize 
them. For Aristotle, phronesis: 1) is a sort of reasoning that mainly applies to 
praxis, and to particulars, applying deliberation to things that are contingent; 
2) it is necessary to attain the several excellences that make a good or 
virtuous life; 3) its main domain of application is the individual life in its 
quest for happiness or flourishing but this is connected to an overall goal 
that is tied to a “function of man” and that somehow exceeds the individual; 
4) it is a capacity unfolding through time and experience and fundamentally 
changing s/he who practices it through a continuous exercise; 5) there is 
no absolute certainty on its results because, unlike theoretical (scientific) 
reason, its epistemic status is that of a reasoned opinion; 6) its particular 
form of reasoning implies a discernment that is sensitive to context.
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These last traits actually reveal something that Aristotle does not 
clearly emphasize but that should be taken stock of. As Attic tragedies 
masterfully showed, and as someone such as Martha Nussbaum so clearly 
spelled out, there is a “fragility of goodness”. And this fragility is also tied 
to the epistemic status that can be granted to the results of practical wisdom, 
and which are far from what could be expected after the dawn of Modern 
philosophy. But perhaps this fragility of goodness and the tentative status 
of practical wisdom are just a more accurate description of the ‘human 
condition’ (let us forget for a moment the parlance of something such as a 
‘human essence’), its finitude, and the uncertain results of action, including 
ethically qualified action. But this, of course, is at odds with most Modern 
moral philosophies. While I cannot, in this article, recall all these traits, it 
will be useful, in the next section, to see how the phronetic model resurfaces 
in the ethics of Paul Ricœur, precisely as a way to solve the impasses of one 
notable instance of a Modern moral philosophy: Kant’s deontological model.
II – Practical Wisdom in Ricœur’s ‘Little Ethics’
Aristotelian practical philosophy has received a renewed interest since 
the second half of the 20th Century, both in Anglophone and Continental 
philosophy. Authors such as Elizabeth Anscombe5, Martha Nussbaum6, 
Alasdair MacIntyre7, Charles Taylor8 and Paul Ricœur, to name only some of 
the most prominent figures of this wave of neo-Aristotelian inspiration, have 
all contributed to emphasize important aspects in which Aristotle (sometimes 
in tandem with Hegel, most notably in Taylor and Ricœur) seems to offer 
more promising solutions for devising an ethical theory than the dominant 
Kantian or Utilitarian approaches to ethics. While it is impossible, in this 
short piece, to assess all these contributions, I choose Paul Ricœur’s for two 
basic reasons: first, because his Aristotelian response is directly tied to an 
honest assessment of one notable strand of Modern moral philosophy; second, 
because his response, and unlike many other neo-Aristotelian ‘virtue theories’ 
or ‘virtue ethics’ that are to be found nowadays, gives phronesis center stage9 .
5  See Cadilha 2020.
6  Nussbaum 2013.
7  MacIntyre 2007.
8  Taylor 1989.
9  On Ricœur’s recovery of Aristotelian phronesis in his proposal of a “practical 
wisdom” see Portocarrero 2011, Galindo 2013, Zarauza 2013.
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To be sure, Ricœur’s most important contribution to the revival of 
Aristotelian ethics is to be found in the studies 7, 8 and 9 of Oneself as 
Another, which constitute what Ricœur himself dubbed his “little ethics”. 
The humble title notwithstanding, this attempt at putting forward an ethical 
theory is an ambitious effort to reconcile two very different – and more often 
than not seem as irreconcilable – ethical standpoints, the teleological and 
the deontological, Kant and Aristotle. This ‘little ethics’, in turn, is only a 
part – even though it comprises roughly a third of the book – of the overall 
project of Oneself as Another, which is an essay in fundamental anthropology 
that aims at establishing a list of fundamental capacities pertaining to the 
human being, in what Ricœur dubs an “ontology of attestation”. These 
three studies only deal with the capacity of the self to be imputable, i.e., 
to be responsible for ethical action (or the lack thereof), whereas in the 
previous studies the capacities to speak, act, and narrate are scrutinized. 
More specifically, in these studies Ricœur analyzes the attribution of the 
predicates ‘good’ and ‘obligatory’ to action.
In Ricœur’s model, ethics is the (Aristotelian) domain of the aim 
for an accomplished life, while morality is the articulation of this aim in 
norms that strive for universality and have an effect of constraint (i.e. they 
determine what is permitted and even obligatory, and what is forbidden)10 . 
Ricœur’s effort is one of filling the gaps between the teleological and the 
deontological standpoints to devise a more comprehensive ethical theory, one 
that can take stock of both the aspirational and the normative components 
of a sound ethical theory while also opening for the intricacies and case-
-by-case decisions demanded by ‘hard cases’ and applied ethics, i.e. those 
that demand special attention and an invention of solutions in which a rule 
is somehow invented while the case itself is being solved. To this decision-
-making taking place in a thick evaluative context Ricœur calls ‘situated 
judgment’ and, in devising its model, he borrows the Aristotelian phronetic 
model while at the same time gearing it towards a more intersubjective 
framework, through a reinterpretation of Hegelian Sittlichkeit (the thick 
‘ethical life’ of a whole people or community, composed of its customs, 
habits, ingrained practices and traditions) and of a discourse ethics such as 
it appears in Apel and Habermas.
As it now is becoming apparent, this is a complex model with several 
influences, and it is not possible to comment on all of its details here. But 
10  Ricœur 1992: 170.
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allow me to unpack its main traits, with an emphasis on how the phronetic 
model appears at a pivotal point in the argument and how Aristotle’s 
phronesis is both recovered and expanded in this movement. The framework 
of Ricœur’s little ethics basically entails three main claims11: 1) There is 
a primacy of ethics over morality, i.e., of the ‘ethical aim’ over the norm; 
however, 2) the ethical aim needs to pass through the sieve of the norm 
with its formal constraints of universalization and constraint ruled by the 
duty to obey the moral law; and 3) when the universal application of the 
norm runs into trouble and can no longer be blindly followed because it is 
faced with aporetic situations, then the norm can go back to the aim (and, as 
we shall see, to the claims underlying its basic convictions) to try to solve 
the conundrum. Let us see each of these moments in a little more detail.
Ricœur defines the ethical aim (or intention) as “aiming at the ‘good life’ 
with and for others in just institutions”12. Following his claim on the primacy 
of the ethical aim, we can thus say that his starting point is Aristotelian, 
insofar as the eudemonic quest for the good life appears as the first ethical 
worry, and also as the overarching standpoint, given that the deontological 
passage is just a ‘moment’ in the architecture of this ethical framework. 
Moreover, the theory of selfhood put forward in Oneself as Another is 
intrinsically dialogic, intersubjective, as the self is always understood 
against the backdrop of the capacities and practices that constitute him or 
herself in interaction with others. Therefore, the attribution of the predicate 
‘good’ to action (in interaction with others) is of the utmost importance, 
in that it is through a very specific type of action that some feelings that 
are fundamental for the development of the self (and for the establishment 
of sound relations with others) unfold. This is the case of self-esteem and 
solicitude (care) for others.
Thus, for Ricœur, following Aristotle, the ‘good life’ is to be sought 
after in praxis13. Importantly, Ricœur sees in the Aristotelian model a close tie 
between phronesis and s/he who holds it, the phronimos: “a tie that becomes 
meaningful only if the man of wise judgment determines at the same time the 
rule and the case, by grasping the situation in its singularity”14. At this point, 
we might ask: why does Ricœur, who holds such an Aristotelian viewpoint, 
11  Ibid .
12  Ibid.: 172.
13  Ibid .
14  Ibid.: 175.
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deem it necessary to resort to Kant? The answer lies in the fact that the ethical 
aim must undergo critique and the difficulties of instantiation in practice. 
For Ricœur, at the start, the aim and solicitude are ‘innocent’, ‘naïve’: “with 
respect to its content, the ‘good life’ is, for each of us, the nebulous of ideals 
and dreams of achievements with regard to which a life is held to be more or 
less fulfilled or unfulfilled”15. A fit between the preferential choices applied 
to action and this nebulous ideal is therefore constantly sought after; but 
in order for this to take place an exercise of interpretation is always called 
for. It is important to note, following Ricœur16, that the epistemic status of 
the verification of the fit between the life plans (the concrete content of the 
projected aim for the good life) and the daily choice of practices devised to 
follow that plan is that of ‘experiential evidence’; i.e., this is precisely an 
interpretation and not the sort of evidence to be expected from experimental 
sciences; and this interpretation in turn becomes, in Ricœur’s ontology, a 
moment of ‘attestation’: through this interpretation, the self checks whether 
or not s/he might be on the right track in his or her provisional approximation 
to living well.
Nevertheless, this assessment of the ethical aim would for Ricœur be 
incomplete without the test of universalization and constraint demanded 
by the moral norm. By that Ricœur means the passage through a different 
ethical universe, that of Kantian moral philosophy. Indeed, for Ricœur 
the passage of the ethical aim through the moral norm actually enriches 
it – this passage forces the aim to confront itself with other possible 
ethical aims (those held by other selves) and poses the possibility of evil, 
of what should be avoided and is forbidden. Accordingly, after the ethical 
aim and its component of solicitude are transformed by the deontological 
moment, naïve (let us call it “first degree”) solicitude becomes a critical 
solicitude that is able to discern the best tentative solution in the cases 
of conflicts of duties. And this is when the phronetic model reappears.
Ricœur disagrees with Kant’s claim on the simplicity of duty. Analyzing 
the several formulations of the categorical imperative he asks: to what or to 
whom do we owe respect? Is it primarily to the moral law in its universality, 
or to the concrete persons that are at any given moment at stake? Contrary to 
Kant’s thesis on the simplicity of duty, Ricœur contends that the categorical 
15  Ibid.: 179.
16  Ibid.: 180.
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imperative itself generates a multiplicity of rules17 that might clash among 
themselves, for instance when one is put in a situation in which to obey 
one rule necessarily involves disregarding a different rule – a situation 
that might become tragic when one of the duties at stake stems from the 
demands of otherness, i.e., from the solicitude to other people.
This much becomes apparent in the interlude to the ninth study of 
Oneself as Another, interlude to which Ricœur significantly calls “Tragic 
Action” and that is put under the banner of Antigone. That the example is 
borrowed from Greek tragedy is not by chance, for Ricœur believes that 
tragedy can be a source for philosophy to meditate, in spite of it not being 
philosophy itself. He thus refers to the “instruction of ethics by tragedy”18, 
claiming that “tragic wisdom carries practical wisdom back to the test of 
moral judgment in situation alone”19. Accordingly, what Ricœur takes from 
Sophocles’ Antigone is the following: Antigone is placed at a tragic junction 
precisely because, one way or another, she will be disrespecting a specific 
duty emanating from a fully binding law. On the one hand, she is called 
upon by custom and divine law to give her brother a sepulcher even though 
he has become an enemy of the city. On the other hand, she is enjoined 
by positive law to obey Creon who, as a sitting ruler, forbids his burial.
It goes without saying that Antigone poses a complex problem that 
cannot be reduced to a sober moral deliberation on preferable choice, insofar 
as a theology of divine blindness is interwoven with the claim that both Creon 
and Antigone make of being responsible for their own acts20. The passions 
involved, with their irreducible component of irrationality, and Antigone’s 
tragic fate itself, are there to remind us that what is at stake in Tragedy 
itself cannot be entirely captured by means of philosophical deliberation 
alone. And yet, Ricœur contends, Antigone teaches us something about the 
“unavoidable nature of conflict in moral life”21 and, in its tragic wisdom, 
already points us to the necessary existence of moral conflicts which the 
formalism of the Kantian deontological moment cannot by itself solve. 
For Ricœur, following George Steiner, Antigone reminds us the “agonistic 
ground of human experience”22 .
17  Ibid.: 262.
18  Ibid.: 241.
19  Ibid .
20  Ibid.: 242.
21  Ibid.: 243.
22  Ibid .
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When faced with these hard cases, in which, for instance, respect 
for a formal law and solicitude for a concrete person are at odds23 Ricœur 
seems to contend, as a rule of thumb, that respect is due first and foremost 
to persons, and not to the formal law itself. However, in such hard cases, 
he asserts that “practical wisdom consists here in inventing just behavior 
suited to the singular nature of the case”24 but with a caveat: that this 
behavior is not simply arbitrary25. On the contrary, in the phronetic model 
that Ricœur will borrow from Aristotle and update in his own fashion, the 
rule will stem from the particular case (as in the case of reflective judgment) 
in what Ricœur will define as the moral judgment in situation. And in this 
Ricœur will rely on a dialectic between the ethics of argumentation and 
considered convictions26 .
Ricœur maintains that the horizon of phronesis is the good life of the 
phronimos, by means of deliberation, and applied to singular situations27 . 
However, this phronesis is to be exercised in specific contexts that are thick, 
i.e., that have to take into stock existing customs and practices, and the 
argumentation of considered convictions in intersubjective exchanges and 
debate. Ricœur contends that “it is through public debate, friendly discussion 
and shared convictions that moral judgment in situation is formed”28. In other 
words: for Ricœur no one can be wise alone; we could say, updating Aristotle’s 
terminology, that for Ricœur phronesis is a dialogic virtue in which it is the 
thick context provided by the concrete situation and the interaction with 
others that makes a wise deliberation possible. In hard cases, it is wise to seek 
advice and to mediate considered convictions through reasoned exchange. 
Therefore, as we can see, in the development of his phronetic model 
Ricœur comes back to Aristotle after traversing Kant’s moral philosophy, but 
the model he develops conciliates the Aristotelian inspiration with a more 
intersubjective and argumentative model of deliberation. This model seems 
more feasible than a blind application of moral rules supposed to be both 
23  To give only one example: should the moral demand to tell the truth apply 
universally, including to patients who are dying, even if this makes their suffering more 
acute? In this case the sheer respect for the law seems to be in conflict with solicitude for 
the wellbeing of the person. (See Ricœur 1992: 269)
24  Ibid.: 269.
25  Ibid .
26  Ibid.: 289.
27  Ibid.: 290.
28  Ibid .
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universal and simple. But it is also not without a fair share of perplexities 
and difficulties. In my very brief last section I pinpoint two of them.
III – Critical Remarks
In this paper I have shown how a contemporary recovery of Aristotelian 
phronesis is useful to go beyond some of the difficulties presented by Kantian 
moral philosophy, and that Ricœur’s attempt provides us with a more intersub-
jective phronetic model within the context of his fundamental anthropology. 
Devising such an ethical theory has important implications for the way moral 
agents – i. e., to use the modern vocabulary, the ‘subjects’ or ‘selves’ that 
underlie ethical action – are conceived. For instance, if we consider that in 
the Aristotelian framework, praxis fundamentally changes agents themselves 
and thus that the end goal is the development or flourishing of human beings, 
it is easy to conclude that what we find here are thick accounts of subjectivity 
and identity. In a way, this is very different from the standard accounts of 
selfhood put forward by deontological liberalism in the 20th Century, in the 
wake of John Rawls’29 post-Kantian moral philosophy. As such, the Aristotelian 
revival connects to communitarian critiques of that standpoint, such as Michael 
Sandel’s30. However, some problems with this account remain, and I will 
emphasize two: essentialism and the status of rationality in human action.
Throughout the paper I highlighted that in the backdrop of Aristotle’s 
theory there lurks an essentialist presupposition. However, this is evidently 
problematic. It is not clear that human beings have immutable “essences” or 
that there is something such as a specific “function” or “task” for humankind. 
As such, the type of moral perfectionism that is sometimes at work in 
Aristotelian-inspired virtue theories should be wary of too straightforward 
an answer on what can really be a good life for human beings in general. 
Accordingly, I believe that there is an irreducible dimension of plurality 
in the life forms that can be esteemed as good. It seems to me that the 
movement between the ideal of good life and its concrete instantiation can 
admit several possibilities in terms of its substantive content. This is not to 
say that every life form can count as a good life form, or that we cannot 
criticize life forms. As Rahel Jaeggi31 contends, we can indeed exert such a 
29  Rawls 1999.
30  Sandel 1982.
31  Jaeggi 2018.
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critique, and we actually need to. But this is far from saying that only one 
specific life form should count as a good, accomplished life.
At the start of this paper I also highlighted the way in which phronesis 
is simultaneously a form of practical wisdom and practical reasoning, and I 
hinted at the way in which we should discern several types of reasoning and 
not expect their results or processes to have the same epistemic status. This 
is, in my view, mainly useful to counter what can sometimes be mainstream, 
one-sided, even reductionist accounts of reason that might tend to consider 
that only certain specific disciplines or processes (e.g. those stemming 
from the so-called ‘hard’, exact sciences) can count as being ‘rational’. 
And in this – or in what I have called elsewhere a critique of miserable 
reason – the Aristotelian standpoint can be very useful, for it emphasizes 
alternative forms of rationality that are more at work in the Humanities and 
in a practical philosophy more sensible than the ones inspired by Modern 
philosophy. Be that as it may, phronesis and the deliberative choice that 
serves as its mean need also to be confronted with what with we today 
know on the limits of rationality.
Let there be no mistake: Aristotle was a profound inquirer of the human 
psyche and by no means should he be considered a ‘rationalist’. Within 
Aristotle’s practical philosophy, we are far away from the standpoint of Modern 
science and philosophy, with its neat separation of reason, emotions and 
feelings. However, deliberate choice still entails a process of consideration of 
different possibilities that seems to take place in some sort of sequence. This 
is not to ignore that the process is exploratory and might involve some sort of 
‘tact’ or ‘intuition’ as we hinted at above. But if we look at the way in which 
this process seems to unfold, it would seem that the phronetic model suggests 
that in the dialectical movement between the ideal of the accomplished life 
and the concrete options at hand, a process of weighing the ‘pros and cons’ 
would take place, and that this process itself would be rational.
However, what we today know about the way the human mind works 
in the decision-making process leading to action seems to suggest that this 
process is less straightforward. Indeed, some works in the fields of behavioral 
economics or cognitive psychology seem to indicate that our decision-making 
processes are, more often than not, more ‘automatic’ than what would seem 
at first hand. Daniel Kahneman32, for instance, has put forward his theory 
of the two systems guiding our mental processes: system 1 being more or 
32  Kahneman 2011.
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less automatic and instinctive (fast), while system 2 demands our specific 
attention in the deliberation process (slow). Clearly, phronesis would be 
a process pertaining to system 2. What Kahneman suggests though is that 
most of the time system 1 is in charge, and not only that it functions on 
the basis of instincts and affects, but also that it can be misguided in its 
judgments by certain heuristics.
Now, these hints coming from contemporary cognitive sciences are 
obviously not an absolute novelty in intellectual history. Indeed, they are 
reminiscent, for instance, of Pascal, system 1 closely resembling the intuitions 
and the ‘automatic’ mode of living of that which Pascal called ‘the heart’ 
(and the parallel could also be extended to include a relation with Platonic 
doxa), while system 2 would be what Pascal called ‘reason’. And Ricœur 
himself developed, in his early works, investigations of the specific relation 
between the voluntary in the involuntary, both in his phenomenological 
works33 and in his initial sketch of a philosophical anthropology in Fallible 
Man34. However, if these findings from cognitive science are correct, the 
novelty is perhaps not only the very close intertwinement between system 
1 and 2, but also the fact that the predominance of system 1 is even greater 
than what we had anticipate before. And this of course marks the limits of a 
phronetic model, because we sometimes tend to choose much more rapidly 
and instinctively. Accordingly, even what we intend by phronesis perhaps 
needs some fine-tuning in order to accommodate these findings. But this is of 
course not a task for this short paper, only for future investigation to develop.
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